We investigate thinness of hog and pork markets in terms of quantity and representativeness of negotiated transactions. Transactional volume imparts marginally greater confidence in pricing precision for Iowa-Southern Minnesota negotiated hogs than for the national carcass cut-out, suggesting that contracts tying prices to the former rather than the latter may be more representative of industry conditions. Extending mandatory price reporting to pork may remedy this discrepancy. Despite declining volume, terminal hog markets may price accurately off of Iowa-Southern Minnesota prices. Hog quality differentials across procurement methods are documented, and quality of negotiated hogs is shown to decline with declining volume.
The U.S. hog industry, like other livestock/ poultry industries, has experienced substantial consolidation and growth in alternative marketing arrangements since the early 1990s when cash transactions dominated trade (Grimes and Plain, 2005, 2007) . With lower quantities (and perhaps quality) of livestock traded in cash markets, these negotiated transactions are increasingly scrutinized as being unreliable or unrepresentative of industry trade. Implications reach beyond cash markets as many contracts are tied to cash prices. Concern for market price transparency relates to the quantity of trades from which the market price, or price range, is derived, and the term thin market is used to describe markets for which reliability of a supply and demand determined price is questioned due to low volume of transactions (Hayenga et al., 1979; Nelson and Turner, 1995; Tomek, 1980) or perhaps unrepresentative transactions (Anderson et al., 2007) .
The objective of this study is to examine thin market issues for U.S. cash markets for hogs and downstream negotiated prices for the wholesale pork carcass cutout. Empirical research on thin markets in agriculture typically examines whether the quantity of reported transactions in local markets is sufficient to accurately reflect general market conditions (e.g., Nelson and Turner, 1995; Tomek, 1980) . However, transactional volume is merely a proxy for pricing efficiency (Buschena and McNew, 2008) and may not capture quality differentials in hogs transacted through cash markets and contracts (Anderson et al., 2007) . Here, we evaluate pricing accuracy as it relates to volume in hog cash markets (i.e., a declining terminal market in St. Joseph, Missouri and mandatorily reported regional prices for Iowa-Southern Minnesota) and voluntarily reported carcass cutout prices. Specifically, we compare volume in these markets to the level necessary to support various degrees of pricing accuracy, given the observed variation in prices. Additionally, using national data, we document purported hog quality differentials across procurement methods and show that quality of negotiated hogs declines with volume.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief review of the relevant literature, informing the choice of empirical procedures, which are discussed subsequently and are followed by a description of the data. Then the results are presented, followed by a discussion of their implications in the concluding section of the paper.
Previous Research
Much of the relevant literature in agriculture investigates thin markets in terms of quantity issues. Not only do markets with few transactions (or few participants) hold potential for price manipulation 1 (Mueller et al., 1996; Nelson and Turner, 1995) , but more generally, some minimum number of transactions is needed to place confidence in average (equilibrium) prices (Tomek, 1980) . Relatively few transactions may be required, provided they are representative, i.e., occur at the margin (Smith, 1982) . Transaction representativeness has been recognized as a thin market issue only more recently with some cash markets, which often provide a base price for formula contracting, characterized as residual markets, that is markets for lower quality goods (Anderson et al., 2007; Schroeder and Ward, 2000) . However, residual markets may serve an alternative role in facilitating inventory adjustment in addition to (or perhaps in place of) price discovery (Peterson, 2005) . Noting that the conventionally accepted definition of a thin market as ''one with few negotiated transactions per unit of time'' (c.f., Hayenga et al., 1979) has directed researchers' emphasis on transaction volume in empirical studies, Anderson et al. (2007) suggest a more comprehensive taxonomy of thin markets considering both volume and representativeness (i.e., quality or type) issues. The literature is summarized in detail below. Tomek (1980) uses a statistical sampling concept to show that a declining Denver market for fed cattle became a poor place for price discovery, relative to Omaha, prior to closing. Specifically, Chebyshev's inequality is applied to compute the number of transactions that yield a particular level of (confidence in) pricing precision given price variability during the period observed. The large reductions in volume rendered pricing unreliable in the Denver market.
In an experimental setting, Nelson and Turner (1995) find no evidence of systematic price bias in thin (i.e., eight traders) relative to thick (i.e., 22 traders) auction markets. Using a fed cattle market simulation, Ward and Choi (1998) find that even very large reductions in the number of reported cash transactions had little impact on price accuracy. Smith's (1982) work with double-oral auction markets demonstrates that the number of market participants or transactions required to generate perfectly competitive prices may be relatively small, providing each transaction takes place at the margin.
Other studies identify negative impacts of captive supplies (i.e., declining proportional cash transactions) on (expected) fed cattle cash prices, suggestive of potential price manipulation by buyers (Schroeter and Azzam, 2004; Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder, 1998) .
2 Mueller et al. (1996) find that the low volume of transactions and few participants in the National Cheese Exchange (NCE), a residual market for cheese, enable price manipulation by key market participants. Moreover, most cheese is contracted based on NCE prices, though only block 1 While transactional volume and market structure (i.e., number of participants) are distinct issues, they are inextricably linked. Clearly, consolidation on both sides of a market contributes to declining transactions. Furthermore, the potential for price manipulation under low transactional volume may be exacerbated in a market structure with few participants.
2 Captive supplies-commonly secured through marketing/purchasing agreements, forward contracts, and packer feeding-refer to livestock committed to a specific buyer two weeks or more in advance of slaughter, whereas negotiated or cash market transactions are those where livestock are scheduled for delivery to packer within a shorter period of time (Schroeter and Azzam, 2004) . and barrel cheddar cheese trade on the exchange (Hamm and March, 1995) . In the egg industry, where contract prices are predominately tied to Urner-Barry price quotes, another residual market-Egg Clearinghouse, Inc.-serves primarily to facilitate inventory adjustments (Peterson, 2005) . Hence, residual markets may serve important roles beyond price discovery. Vukina et al. (2007) conclude that the increasing proportion of contracted and packer-owned hogs decreases cash hog prices. Vukina et al. (2007) also observe positive correlation between overall hog quality in the industry and the growth of alternative marketing arrangements, thereby attributing detected differences in hog quality across procurement mode to efficiencies of alternative marketing arrangements.
Empirical Methods and Procedures
Following Tomek (1980) , the number of transactions n required to assure a high probability P that the deviation of intraday or daily mean prices X n from the true mean (equilibrium) price m lays within a particular range of accuracy 6c is found using Chebyshev's inequality,
where s 2 is the variance of the distribution of the mean, and n is the number of observations. Rearranging to solve for the minimum n necessary to satisfy the inequality yields follows:
Hence, greater numbers of transactions n are required as the level of pricing precision desired increases (i.e., higher P and lower c), and for any particular chosen level of pricing accuracy, n increases with market variation s 2 . Up to this point, the discussion has emphasized intraday or daily prices under fixed economic conditions. Over time, economic conditions change as do equilibrium prices, which may also vary with quality and across space. Following Tomek (1980) , in such contexts, m is interpreted as the true price difference across time periods (e.g., weeks), qualities (e.g., grades), or locations. Specifically, in the case of autocorrelated prices across space, m may be estimated by year using a first-differenced equation: Plain (2011) . Hence, this value is used to convert St. Joseph receipts to estimated transactions.
Data on Hog Quality
Daily national data on base prices and average prices (accounting for quality premiums and discounts), backfat, loin depth, loineye area, and percent lean by procurement method for producer sold hogs are obtained from LMIC spreadsheets covering prior day national hog slaughter. These data are obtained for the period August 3, 2001 through March 18, 2011. Table 2 provides summary statistics for these data. Although Vukina et al. (2007) find that the highest quality hogs are procured through other procurement arrangements and other market formula contracts, mean statistics in Table 2 suggest that the highest quality hogs are procured through other market formula and market formula contracts on average. Figure 1 illustrates the decline in the proportion of hogs procured through negotiated transactions. Notably, these statistics, which are based on transactions of large packers (greater than 100,000 processed annually), may underestimate the proportion of cash market transactions in the industry, as indicated by surveys with stratified samples of packers (i.e., Vukina et al., 2007) . Still, the data that are mandatorily reported by the large processors represent the most widely/publicly available information influencing prices. Pairwise t-tests of mean differences permit detection of statistical differences in carcass performance and associated quality premiums paid across procurement method, and regression analysis allows inference of the influence of the declining proportion of cash sales on cash market hog quality. used to establish the required number of transactions is estimated from first differences in weekly average negotiated prices for each market. In each case P 5 90%, but the value of c, which is in the context of standard deviations of the first differenced prices, varies at 6$0.25, 6$0.35, and 6$0.45 per hundredweight (cwt).
Results
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Though not reported in tables, sensitivity to P 5 95% is also discussed. Complete results are available from the authors upon request. Several interesting observations are apparent from the results. First, growing price variance is placing increasing volume requirements to maintain confidence in pricing precision in each market. For IAMN in particular, price variance appears to have increased substantially in the period following enactment of MPR (Table 3) . Increased volatility in livestock prices under MPR is at least partly attributable to more comprehensive transaction records under electronic filing and a lessened role of USDA Agricultural Marketing Service market reporters in subjectively filtering mandatorily reported prices (Pendell and Schroeder, 2006; Perry et al., 2005; Ward, 2006) . 6 Increased price variance may also reflect greater variation in hog quality observed under mandatory reporting if transactions were reported selectively under the voluntary system. 5 Based on the suggestions of an anonymous reviewer, we also consider cases where c varies as a percentage of the mean annual price in levels, as assumptions of a fixed mean and variance of price may be unrealistic for lengthy time series. The percentages used are chosen such that the resulting numbers of required transactions are similar to levels required under fixed values of c in the early years of the sample. While the number of transactions required for accurate pricing implied by this approach differs from reported results, the differences are not large enough to qualitatively change conclusions regarding sufficiency of transactional volume. Hence, we focus on the more intuitive fixed values of c. Results for mean varying levels of c are available from the authors upon request. 6 Clearly, filtering out transactions that are unrepresentative in terms of bargaining quality or animal quality is desirable, but removal of outliers reflecting extreme local supply and demand conditions would diminish the representativeness of reported prices (Perry et al., 2005) . USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) officials claim that the Government Accountability Office's (2005, p. 4) finding that even under mandatory reporting ''AMS's instructions to reporters for excluding transactions lacked clarity and precision'' has led to improvement in their reporting instructions (Ward, 2006) . Pendell and Schroeder (2006) suggest that AMS market reporters' subjective filtering of cattle prices may have caused markets to appear less spatially integrated prior to MPR than they actually were. Similarly, if AMS efforts are indeed leading to more representative price reporting, then underestimation of the number of transactions required for accurate pricing is more likely in the voluntary reporting period when actual market volume is in no danger of falling below adequate levels.
7 Empirical investigations of prices in live cattle markets yield no evidence of strategic price reporting under a voluntary system, which may reflect that market thinning or noncompetitive behavior had not reached the level necessary to disrupt the ability of the voluntary price reporting system to provide timely and accurate price information (Fausti and Diersen, 2004; Fausti, Diersen, and Qasmi, 2007) . However, lower intra-week dispersion among quality premiums and discounts for fed cattle prior to MPR are documented as evidence of unrepresentative sample reporting and validation for MPR (Fausti et al., 2010) . may reflect increasing variance in the cost of feed inputs, particularly in 2008. Distinguishing the relative contribution of these factors to price variance is beyond the scope of this research.
Notably, the volume of hogs procured through negotiated transactions in IAMN is sufficient to price within 6$0.35/cwt of the true price 90% of the time, but not for more precise pricing (Table 3) (Table 4 ) and 6$0.60/cwt with 95% confidence. Load counts of carcass cutouts would need to increase by about 20% to 25% in recent years to support the same level of pricing precision as IAMN (i.e., c 5 6$0.35/ cwt and P 5 90%). Though ranging within a dollar (i.e., 6$0.50/cwt) of the true price 90% of the time is a fairly reliable level of accuracy, these results indicate that hog contracts that formula price based off of the mandatorily reported IAMN negotiated hog price are likely more representative of market conditions than those tied to voluntarily reported national carcass cut-out prices. Mandating wholesale pork price reporting may hold potential to increase confidence in the precision of these prices if additional representative transactions are reported without substantially increasing the price variance. Currently, it is estimated that less than a quarter of pork buyers' purchases meet USDA qualifications for negotiated transactions, and only 80% of qualifying transactions are reported (Parcell, Schroeder, and Tonsor, 2009 ).
For St. Joseph, volume has been insufficient for independent price discovery since the mid 1990s (Table 5) . Following Tomek's (1980) comparison of a declining Denver market to a more vibrant Omaha market for fed cattle, the St. Joseph terminal hog market need not rely solely on its own volume to arrive at accurate prices if it can anchor to a viable IAMN market. Table 6 compares St. Joseph mean weekly transactions with the number required for three levels of pricing accuracy. Here, the variance of m (i.e., the squared standard error ofm), obtained from least squares estimates of Equation (3) by year, is used to establish the required number of transactions. 9 Hence, c is in the context of the precision of changes in price differentials between IAMN and St. Joseph. Until 2004, St. Joseph has been able to peg weekly price changes to IAMN weekly price changes within 6$0.10/ cwt of the true difference 90% of the time and is able to do so within 6$0.35/cwt with 90% confidence through 2008 (and with 95% confidence through 2007). Transactional volume in 2009 only supports pricing within 6$0.45/cwt with 90% confidence. About a 33% and 66% increase in the volume of transactions would be needed to price within 6$0.35/cwt for 90% and 95% of the time, respectively, in 2009. These results are contingent upon our assumption of smaller 35 head lots, on average, in the St. Joseph market. It is unlikely that lots are much smaller than this, but if lots are larger, then the reported findings underestimate the degree to which transactional volume is insufficient.
Quality Aspects of Thin Markets
In addition to lower volumes in thinning cash markets for hogs and pork, another criticism is that transactions in those markets may not reflect the quality of product generally available. Table 7 reports procurement mode's market share of hogs sold, and pairwise t-tests of mean differences in hog quality between negotiated transactions and Note: n 5 962 observations (1992 to June 5, 2010) for weekly average prices, and n 5 222 observations (1992 to June 15, 2010) for monthly receipts which are used to compute mean weekly volumes. Var, variance.
9 Standard error estimates are computed using the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation and Newey-West variance-covariance matrix to account, respectively, for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity detected by diagnostic tests of initial regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
other procurement methods for the entire sample, as well as three consecutive three year subsamples. 10 This design aids in assessing whether differences in hog quality across procurement mode have become more prominent over time. Moreover, subsample periods correspond to typical marketing contract duration of three to five years (Kliebenstein and Lawrence, 1995) , facilitating insight into possible adjustments that could be made at contract renewal/renegotiation to make formula pricing representative of the industry conditions.
In each period, mean quality measures for negotiated transactions are presented, followed by mean differences with other procurement in ensuing rows (Table 7) . Full sample results reveal statistically lower quality premiums (average price minus base price) for negotiated transactions, corresponding to statistically lower quality hogs in terms of smaller loins and lower percent lean, relative to other procurement methods. Findings for backfat differentials across procurement modes are mixed, as some alternative procurement methods have higher while others have lower values for these quality attributes than negotiated transactions. Statistically significant mean differences for loin depth and loin eye area growing ever more negative across consecutive sub-periods corroborate assertions of decreasing relative quality of cash market hogs, particularly in comparison with the most common procurement mode-market formula contracts. Notably, the proportion of hogs sold on average through these contracts increased 6% from the first to the last sub-period of the sample studied, accounting for most of the 7% decrease in negotiated hog sales.
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However, evidence of the declining relative quality of cash market hogs in terms of backfat and percentage lean, and consequently quality premiums, is mixed. Backfat and percentage lean are clearly related, and in relation to market formula contract hogs in particular, cash market hogs are closing the gap in terms of leanness. These findings may reflect general industry wide improvements in hog genetics and management over time, as evidenced by the regression analysis results discussed next. Overall, the results are largely consistent with the previous findings of Vukina et al. (2007) in that statistical differences in each measure of quality are detected across procurement mode. Vukina et al. (2007) attribute such differences to efficiencies of alternative marketing arrangements. Next we investigate the possibility that the generally lower quality of cash market hogs may be related to the declining proportion of hogs traded in cash markets.
Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity regressions of these measures of negotiated hog quality on the share of hogs marketed through negotiated transactions, denoted %CASH, and a trend variable t are reported in Table 8 . 12 The trend variable t indicates improvements in quality (i.e., lower backfat and greater loin size and percentage lean) occur over time, perhaps due to advancements in genetics and/or management. Meanwhile, the quality of cash market hogs tends to decrease with the declining share of hogs procured through negotiated transactions, except in terms of backfat. Specifically, with a 10% decrease in %CASH, loin depth decreases about four hundredths of an inch, loin 10 The Central Limit Theorem implies that t-test assumptions of a normally distributed sample mean are well approximated in large samples. The results of nonparametric paired sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test of median differences, not presented here but available from the authors upon request, are largely consistent with the results of t-tests presented here.
11 Several studies suggest that contracting is significantly more likely among larger farms (Franken, Pennings, and Garcia, 2009; Key and McBride, 2003) . The number of farms with 2,000 or more hogs increased during the period of study, with 7,155, 7,868, and 8,313 farms on average in the three consecutive sub-periods, according to USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (2011).
12 Diagnostic tests of simple ordinary least squares models indicated the presence of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, leading to the use of generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models. Specifically, GARCH(1,1) models were chosen, as these models have been shown to be robust in Monte Carlo analyses (Lusdaine, 1995) . Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root (i.e., nonstationarity) in each case, and hence, the regression analysis is performed on the stationary data in levels. The large inverse correlation (20.855) between %CASH and the trend variable t could pose multicollinearity problems, but the potential for such problems is low with the large sample size.
eye area decreases twelve hundredths of a square inch, and percentage lean decreases nearly a third of a percent. While these estimates are statistically significant, they are not very large in magnitude. Still, these results imply that the negative relationship between captive supplies of fed cattle (i.e., declining proportional cash transactions) and cash prices, interpreted by Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder (1998) and Schroeter and Azzam (2004) as evidence of potential price manipulation by buyers, may also partly reflect a simultaneous decrease in the quality of animals traded in cash markets.
Conclusions
This study investigates the thinness of hog and pork markets, as measured by quantity and quality based indicators. Statistical sampling procedures indicate that transactional volume for negotiated hogs in the Iowa-Southern Minnesota market and for the national carcass cutout is sufficient to impart confidence in the reliability of pricing precision. The results further suggest that formula contract prices based off of mandatorily reported Iowa-Southern Minnesota negotiated hog prices may be more representative of industry conditions than contracts tied to voluntarily reported national carcass cut-out prices. Specifically, with a 90% level of confidence, the Iowa-Southern Minnesota market has sufficient volume to support pricing within 6$0.35/cwt of the true price, whereas reported volume for the national carcass cut-out only supports pricing within 6$0.45/cwt. Load counts of carcass cut-outs would need to increase by about 20% to 25% in recent years to support the same level of pricing precision as the Iowa-Southern Minnesota market. Mandatory reporting of underlying pork primals may increase the reliability of carcass cut-out pricing precision. Similar analyses indicate that a terminal hog market in St. Joseph, Missouri is no longer viable for independent price discovery, but until very recently could price fairly reliably based off of Iowa-Southern Minnesota prices. At 2009 levels of volume in St. Joseph, pricing accuracy within only 6$0.45/cwt with 90% confidence is supported, and continued declines in volume would likely render pricing unreliable.
Statistically significant, though economically minor deficiencies in negotiated hog quality relative to hogs procured via alternative marketing arrangements are documented. Furthermore, negotiated hog quality is shown to decrease significantly with the declining share of hogs procured through negotiated transactions. This finding has several practical implications and could lead to policy changes. Industry leaders, academicians, and government agency service providers came together in 2010 and 2011 to undertake negotiated rulemaking to set policy for the mandatory price reporting of wholesale pork prices. One of the motivations for mandatory wholesale pork price reporting is to enable the industry to have access to a reliable and transparent carcass cutout value with respect to quality. Producers and processors believe that with a more transparent cutout value, hog marketing contracts will use the cutout as the base price in the contract. Upon wholesale pork prices being mandatorily reported, those producers using the live hog price as the base price in the contract are expected to transition to the wholesale cutout value. Commodity markets transitioning to quality differentiated markets represent a piece of the history of commodity evolution.
A price series reflective of a good with changing levels of characteristic quality over time is troublesome from a practical standpoint. Buyers, sellers, and resource providers attempt to make future decisions based on historical price-quantity relationships that may no longer be relevant. The U.S. Census Bureau faces similar challenges in reporting index prices in which the quality of the good changes over time, for example, the computer of today is not the computer of last year or five years ago. Characteristic adjusted price series, using the hedonic model methodology, offer a mechanism for a consistent price series to be reported. If the price-quality relationships are known between the price of a commodity and the levels of a set of attributes, then price adjustments can be matched between historical observations and future innovations.
While history suggests there will continue to be some level of spot market hog transactions, the societal value versus the cost of publicly collecting and aggregating data and reporting the information should be analyzed. This is particularly the case when the historical relevance, due to quality differentiation, of the price data is eroded over time. From the authors' perspective, the value of cash price series has declined substantially over time, and without adequately accounting for quality changes over time, the historical practice of pricing contract hogs based on cash market live hog transactions may be misleading due to evolving quality trends. [Received August 2011; Accepted March 2012.] 
